Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Grants Certiorari to Determine Whether the
“Continuous Representation Rule” Should be
Adopted in Pennsylvania to Toll the Statute
of Limitations in an Action for Legal
Malpractice
Glenbrook Leasing Company v. Beausang,
839 A.2d 437 (Pa.Super. 2003), cert.
granted March 11, 2005 by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court
By: Matthew S. Marrone, Esquire
Plaintiff (a real estate partnership)
retained the defendant law firm on or about
October 1987 to prepare an agreement of sale
and deed in connection with plaintiff’s
proposed purchase of office space for
medical offices. In addition to the sale and
purchase of office space, the agreement of
sale also stated the seller (who was
maintaining ownership of certain exterior
portions of the premises) would reserve
parking spaces for the use of the buyer and
the buyer’s patients. The real estate
closing occurred on April 21, 1988, at which
time a deed for office space was conveyed to
plaintiff, but was silent with respect to
the parking spaces. The defendant law firm’s
representation of plaintiff in the real
estate transaction concluded in 1988.
Plaintiff used the parking spaces without
incident until 1994, when a dispute arose
with the owner of the outside common
elements. On October 11, 1994, plaintiff
became aware title to the parking spaces was
never conveyed, and on November 21, 1994 the
defendant law firm was accused of legal
malpractice in a letter sent by the owner of
the common elements (on which plaintiff was
copied). However, plaintiff did not
immediately pursue any legal action against
defendant. Instead, litigation regarding
the parking spaces commenced between the
common elements owner (plaintiff) and
Glenbrook (defendant), in which Glenbrook
requested the defendant law firm represent
it. This litigation culminated in December
1999 with a bench trial at which the common
elements owner prevailed.
Thereafter, Glenbrook initiated suit on
December 6, 2000 against the defendant law
firm for legal malpractice. Following
discovery, the court granted the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment based on the
statute of limitations. The trial court
noted Pennsylvania follows the “occurrence
rule,” which mandates the statute of
limitations commences upon the happening of
the alleged breach of duty. Although the
“equitable discovery rule” will toll the
running of the statute in situations where
an injured party is unable - despite the
exercise of due diligence - to know of the
injury or its cause, a lack of knowledge,
mistake or misunderstanding will not toll
the running of the statute. The trial court
found, at a minimum, Glenbrook knew of the
defendant law firm’s alleged negligence as
early as November 21, 1994, but chose not to
file suit until December 6, 2000, well
beyond the two-year statute of limitations
for legal malpractice actions.
On appeal to the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania, plaintiff argued (inter
alia) that in legal malpractice actions,
instead of the “equitable discovery rule”
the court should apply the “continuous
representation rule,” under which the
statute of limitations would not commence
running until December 1, 2000 when
plaintiff fired the defendant law firm.
Glenbrook argued the “vast majority of other
jurisdictions” have accepted the concept
that the continuous representation of a
client by an attorney tolls the running of a
statute of limitations, and cited other
Pennsylvania cases wherein plaintiff claimed
it was “tacitly acknowledged” Pennsylvania
courts follow the continuous representation
rule. Not only was the Superior Court
unpersuaded by plaintiff’s arguments and
case citations, it further noted it was not
empowered to announce such a sweeping change
in the law relating to when the statute of
limitations begins to accrue, finding this
is a task best entrusted to the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania or the General
Assembly.
The fact the Supreme Court has agreed to
hear plaintiff’s appeal from this decision
seems to indicate it is at least somewhat
intrigued by plaintiff’s argument, and feels
it is worth consideration. Whether or not
it will adopt such a “sweeping change”
remains to be seen, and we will report
future developments on this issue and case.
